Leaked n8n API Tokens Exposed 321 Live Instances to Credential Theft

GitGuardian researchers have uncovered a significant exposure of n8n workflow automation API tokens, identifying 4,576 unique credentials across 1,255 hostnames in public GitHub commits. Of the 896 n8n instances reachable during testing, 321 accepted at least one leaked token—meaning roughly 36% of reachable deployments could be authenticated using credentials scraped from open repositories. The findings demonstrate how a single token leak can cascade into broader access, since n8n is commonly used to connect databases, source code repositories, cloud environments, AI services, and customer support platforms through stored credentials. Security teams should immediately audit their repositories and rotate any exposed secrets, verifying exposure with a password checker and confirming their organization's domains have not been compromised via an email breach checker.

The researchers reproduced four practical attack techniques in a controlled n8n environment using only documented REST API functionality and standard HTTP requests—no exploit code or specialized tooling required. These methods could expose workflow definitions and execution data, allow attackers to reuse stored credentials, and in certain configurations, extract the underlying credential values directly. Although n8n encrypts stored credentials at rest using the N8N_ENCRYPTION_KEY master secret, the platform must decrypt them whenever a workflow runs. An attacker holding a sufficiently privileged API token can reference those credentials in new workflows, effectively turning the automation platform into an oracle that calls internal systems on the attacker's behalf.

With more than 100,000 n8n instances visible through Shodan and roughly 58% of scanned deployments running versions affected by known security advisories, the platform's attack surface is substantial. The recent CVE-2025-68613 expression injection flaw, carrying a CVSS score of 9.9, enables attackers to escape execution sandboxes and gain arbitrary read or write access to the host filesystem. Organizations running self-hosted n8n deployments should audit their internet exposure—starting with a port scanner to verify which services are publicly reachable—patch to the latest version, rotate all API tokens, and review workflow permissions to ensure stored credentials follow least-privilege principles. The incident underscores that automation platforms acting as integration hubs have become high-value targets where a single leaked token can unlock an organization's entire technology stack.